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Abstract 
Having played a substantial role in the bipolar period, the Arctic has found itself at the 
“backyard” of international politics after the Cold War. During the last decade of the 
XXth  century, the Arctic was the priority issue only for the littoral states. The Russian 
expedition to the North Pole in the so-called “last scramble” for energy resources drew 
regional interest of a wide range of international actors, including NATO. The Alliance 
faced a serious task of elaborating its policy in the Arctic to meet its member-states’ and 
associated partners’ modern-day reality expectations. NATO started close cooperation 
with Norway trying to shape a policy that could bring an added value to the region in 
terms of positive security thinking, largely dominating European agenda after the Cold 
War. However, a rapid change of the security situation since the beginning of the 
Russian-Ukrainian conflict has shifted the Alliance’s agenda towards the continent and 
its relations with Moscow raising concerns about the revival of the traditional bipolar 
thinking about the security and prospective remilitarization of the Arctic. It is vital for 
the Alliance to shape its policy, both strategically and tactically, to face those security 
challenges and guarantee peace and stability in the Arctic. 
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Introduction 
 
This article seeks to examine NATO’s in statu nascendi policy in the 
Arctic in the post-bipolar period. To explore the issue, it uses the discussion on 
positive and negative security and its correspondence to the modern-day reality, 
which challenges the issue of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict and the revival of 
traditional politics of the Russian Federation. In particular, the research asks 
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how both the security environment and thinking about security, theoretical and 
practical, have changed since the end of the Cold War. The article tries to 
analyze the influence of a positive security approach on the Arctic development 
and transformation of the Alliance in the 1990s. To answer the proposed 
question, the paper applies negative and positive security conceptions, since the 
discussions of security situation in the High North are usually held within the 
categories of the above-mentioned conceptions. Several theorists have made 
their contribution to the debate, as security is a key value to every state in the 
international arena. As Gunhild Hoogensen Gjorv noted, “notions of positive 
and negative security… relate to the way in which security has been 
conceptualized and how scholars and practitioners themselves place a ‘value’ on 
security.”1 To examine the whole Alliance’s policy in the XXIst century and in 
particular in the Arctic, the article employs a synthetic analytical framework 
elaborated by Hoogensen.
2
 She argues that developments in the Arctic, as well 
as its specifics, designate the concept of positive security accompanied by 
multi-actor security approach as the most relevant.
3
 At her turn, Annika 
Bergman Rosamond underlines that the Arctic “is situated within a complex 
web of multilateral and bilateral networks, ranging from states to regional institutions.”4   
Since the end of the Cold War, the Arctic region has been left at the 
periphery of the international politics being placed on the domestic policy 
agenda of the Arctic littoral and non-littoral countries. Endeavors made by the 
Arctic states to attract attention of the US, European states, EU and NATO have 
not been very successful. However, the situation has begun to slightly change 
after the military operation in Iraq in 2003 and the subsequent rise in oil and gas 
prices in the world market. Being heated with globalization, world economy 
harshly needs new energy sources. The Arctic region appeared to be the most 
promising in this context. Basically, an increased interest towards the region 
was induced by the Russian expedition to the North Pole, which was quite 
provocative and aroused a range of negative and sharp reactions in the 
international arena, especially in the Arctic states. The problem of the Arctic 
became actual placing the region on the agenda of the modern international 
relations, and forcing countries and organizations engaged in the situation to 
formulate their policy towards the Arctic. In 2009, Scott Borgerson assumed 
that the Arctic could become territory “of a Hobbesian free-for-all with 
                                               
1  Gunhild Hoogensen Gjorv, “Security by any other name: negative security, positive 
security, and a multi-actor security approach,” Review of International Studies 38, no. 04 
(October 2012): 836, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0260210511000751. 
2  Gjorv, “Security,” 835-859. 
3  Ibid. 
4  Annika Bergman Rosamond, Perspectives on Security in the Arctic Area. DIIS Report 
(Copenhagen: Danish Institute for International Studies, DIIS, 2011), 7, 
http://pure.diis.dk/ws/files/61204/RP2011_09_Arctic_security_web.pdf. 
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dangerous potential for the conflict,”5 whereas Margaret Blunden stated that the 
situation in the region is “more a revival of traditional power politics than a new 
Cold War.”6  
As the North-Atlantic Treaty Organization is the main security guarantor 
in the Euro-Atlantic region since the end of the World War II, it should react to 
the developments occurring in the Arctic. The debate about NATO’s presence 
in the Arctic can be equated to the debate about what security concept is the 
most relevant to elaborate prospective policy upon it. Security is a dynamic 
phenomenon in its essence and it is evolving in line with the changes in the 
international environment. The more complex processes occur in the 
international arena reflecting growing interconnections and interdependencies 
between different international actors, the more complex security, both in 
theoretical and practical dimensions, becomes.  
The main assumption, when speaking about the Alliance in the High 
North starts from the fact that four of five Arctic littoral states are NATO 
members. Therefore, one of the main questions pertains to the essence of 
NATO’s policy in the Arctic. As widely known, ways of transformation of the 
Alliance and the Arctic in the 1990s, at least in the first half, went in parallel. 
The Arctic was not among the hottest issues on the international agenda, and its 
importance has declined since the end of bilateral confrontation. However, the 
region was not remarginalised as Palosaari and Möller have defined it.
7
 New 
understandings of security, as well as new security paradigms, have dominated 
largely political elites’ thinking in the West. Such approach has been especially 
welcomed in Norway and Denmark. In the large extent due to the transformed 
politics of Oslo, the Arctic has started its move towards demilitarization and 
desecuritisation. It was exactly the northern countries who did an extensive 
work to raise the awareness of the Alliance in the importance of the High North 
to Europe, NATO, and the whole international community. 
This article raises a range of research questions in the context analyzed. 
Taking into account, that security approach results from the way security and 
national interests are being perceived within the state, not all NATO member-
states share the same approach towards security in practice and not all of them 
are ready to discard their ambitions and interests with regard to the Arctic and 
                                               
5  Scott G. Borgerson, Statement of Scott G. Borgerson, Visiting Fellow for Ocean 
Governance at the Council on Foreign Relations, Before the Committee on Foreign 
Affairs, US House of Representatives, Washington DC, Council on Foreign Relations, 
March 25, 2009, accessed September 17, 2018, https://www.cfr.org/report/us-national-
security-interests-arctic. 
6  Margaret Blunden, “The New Problem of Arctic Stability,” Survival 51, no. 5 (October-
November 2009): 121, https://doi.org/10.1080/00396330903309899. 
7  Teemu Palosaari and Frank Möller, “Security and Marginality: Arctic Europe after the 
Double Enlargement,” Cooperation and Conflict 39, no. 3 (2004): 255, 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0010836704045203. 
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its believed riches. Therefore, is NATO an influential actor in the Arctic and 
what added value(s) can it bring to the region through its presence there? In this 
context, one should ask the question about what conception should become a 
baseline for the Alliance’s policy towards the High North in the nearest future. 
NATO as an organization can create its own policy towards the region; 
alternatively NATO’s policy can be elaborated on Norway’s vision as a leading 
state in the development of the Arctic region.  
A number of analysts, politicians and even academics when discussing 
the essence of the Alliance role in the High North and its prospective policy 
there relate to Article V of NATO’s Treaty stating that the fundamental role of 
NATO in the Arctic is to provide collective defence for its member-states. 
Acknowledging that such point of view has a right to exist, one should ask 
whether such approach serves as masking of the lack of understanding of 
NATO’s role in the region. Does it mean that traditional concept of security still 
prevails in the international arena and the Arctic region will be remilitarized 
again? Additionally, the Alliance will have to reestablish its relations with 
Russia in the region and find the best possible format of collaboration with 
Moscow.
8
   
Undoubtedly, the Arctic influences international security. But does it 
produce rather threats, challenges and risks, or is the Arctic the place for 
cooperation and collaboration? Which dimension of broadly understood security 
refers to the Arctic the most? 
To answer the above-mentioned research questions the proposed article 
advances from providing some background on the Alliance transformation in 
the post-bipolar period according to the changing security environment. 
NATO’s transition into political-military organization directly resulted from 
new understanding of security in post-bipolar period, which is correspondingly 
reflected in Alliance’s documents. Then the article explores the Alliance’s 
attempts to shape its policy towards the Arctic. Further, the article continues 
with the examination of the Alliance’s actual presence in the High North. The 
paper will show the difference between NATO’s presence there and its 
member-states or associated partners which is often been misinterpreted in the 
international arena, and in the Russian Federation. Afterwards, the article shows 
the peculiarity of NATO-Russia relations in the Arctic, since this allows 
presenting a comprehensive context in which the Alliance tries to elaborate its 
Arctic policy. Finally, the article ends with outlining of the key security, 
political and military objectives of NATO’s policy in the Arctic in the nearest 
future.  
                                               
8  On different approaches to prospective NATO-Russia relations in the region see: Todd L. 
Sharp, “The Implications of Ice Melt on Arctic Security,” Defence Studies 11, no. 2 (June 
2011): 297-322, https://doi.org/10.1080/14702436.2011.590318/312-314; Blunden, “The 
New Problem,” 131-134, https://doi.org/10.1080/00396330903309899.  
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NATO’s Basic Documents towards the Arctic 
 
Until now, the North-Atlantic Treaty Organization has not elaborated its 
clear policy towards the region. Thus, the authors intend to formulate a 
conceptual basis of the Alliance’s policy towards the region, based on its 
fundamental documents adopted after 1990 and statements of NATO’s High 
Officials.  
In the post-bipolar period, the Alliance has adopted its “Strategic 
Concepts” in 1991, 1999, and 2010. They clearly demonstrate the 
transformation of NATO, and its understanding of security in modern-day 
reality. “Concept 1991” was a slight, but significant move towards a new 
security environment that has aroused after the end of bipolar times. As it was 
stated in the document, “in contrast with the predominant threat of the past, the 
risks to Allied security that remain are multi-faceted in nature and multi-
directional, which makes them hard to predict and assess.”9 However, the entire 
document puts major emphasis on the European region. What is important, is 
the understanding that “managing the diversity of challenges facing the Alliance 
requires a broad approach to security. This is reflected in three mutually 
reinforcing elements of Allied security policy; dialogue, co-operation, and the 
maintenance of a collective defense capability.”10  
Having analyzed the Strategic Concept 1999, one should admit that the 
Alliance has acknowledged operating within the “environment of continuing 
change,” which generates situations when “security of the Alliance remains 
subject to a wide variety of military and non-military risks which are multi-
directional and often difficult to predict.”11 However, NATO has indicated as 
major sources for prospective conflicts the following: ethnic and religious 
rivalries, territorial disputes, inadequate or failed reforms, the abuse of human 
rights, and the dissolution of states. It is also noted in the document that 
“Alliance security interests can be affected by other risks of a wider nature, 
including acts of terrorism, sabotage and organized crime, and by the disruption 
                                               
9  North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “The Alliance’s New Strategic Concept agreed by the 
Heads of State and Government participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic 
Council,” November 7-8, 1991, accessed September 17, 2018, https://www.nato.int/ 
cps/en/natohq/official_texts_23847.htm?. 
10  North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “New Strategic Concept.” November 7-8, 1991.  
11  North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “The Alliance's Strategic Concept Approved by the 
Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council 
in Washington D.C.,” April 24, 1999, accessed September 17, 2018, https://www.nato.int/ 
cps/en/natohq/official_texts_27433.htm?mode=pressrelease.  
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of the flow of vital resources,”12 though resources have not been defined clearly. 
Similarly to the Concept 1991, it is stated that NATO “is committed to a broad 
approach to security, which recognizes the importance of political, economic, 
social and environmental factors in addition to the indispensable defense 
dimension.”13 The whole document deals mainly with issues of disarmament 
and adherence to non-proliferation regime as well as strengthening cooperation 
across the Euro-Atlantic region.  
Thus Strategic Concept 2010 from the very beginning claims, that it “will 
guide the next phase in the Alliance’s evolution with the aim to be effective in a 
changing world, against new threats, with new capabilities and new partners.”14 
The document has reaffirmed the essential mission of the Alliance to stay as “an 
unparalleled community of freedom, peace, security and shared values.”15 
However, one should speak here both about the content of security and shared 
values, and about changed instruments required for their protection. Collective 
defence, crisis management, and cooperative security are three major 
instruments. Though the Arctic region has not been mentioned in the Concept, 
extended explanation of prospective activities under crisis management and 
cooperative security could be applied to the High North if necessary. As it is 
stated in the document, “the Alliance is affected by, and can affect, political and 
security developments beyond its borders.”16 If such developments threaten 
international security and security of Allies, NATO will actively engage using 
the range of political and military means. At the same time, the Concept 
outlines that “the best way to manage conflicts is to prevent them from 
happening.”17 The document foresees that NATO will monitor the international 
environment on a regular basis and cooperate with non-member countries and 
international organizations not to miss the moment when the big conflict or 
even crisis can emerge.  
European and international developments in 2013-2014 shifted the 
Alliance’s attention directly towards to the core of Europe. The Arctic, on the 
contrary, has been moved out of the spotlight of the Alliance, which can be 
traced in the Warsaw Summit Communiqué adopted in 2016.
18
 In particular, 
                                               
12  North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “The Alliance's Strategic Concept.” April 24, 1999.  
13  Ibid. 
14  North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “Active Engagement, Modern Defence. Strategic 
Concept for the Defence and Security of the Members of the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organisation adopted by Heads of State and Government in Lisbon,” November 19, 2010, 
accessed September 17, 2018, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_68580.htm?. 
15  North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “Active Engagement, Modern Defence.” November 
19, 2010.  
16  Ibid. 
17  Ibid. 
18  North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “Warsaw Summit Communiqué. Issued by the Heads 
of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in 
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while identifying security challenges and threats, the document refers only to 
the east and the south. However, it is stated that NATO, if necessary, will 
adequately react in the North Atlantic, prospective threats include actions 
against sea lines of communication and maritime approaches of NATO 
territory. Though the communiqué reaffirms statements from the previous 
fundamental documents, substantial changes have been introduced as a result of 
hostile actions of the Russian Federation which has violated provisions of the 
international law and the security demands of Allies. The document states that 
“renewed emphasis has been placed on deterrence and collective defense.”19  
The year 2009 happened to be one of the milestones for the Alliance in 
elaborating its policy towards the Arctic. On 28-29 January, 2009, NATO held a 
seminar “Security Prospects in the High North” to address the situation around 
the Arctic as the region heated extraordinary during 2008 and thereby posed 
some risks towards European security.
20
 The high-level meeting could be 
characterized as an introductory to the situation in the region, since its main 
goal was to gather information and elaborate a better understanding of the 
changing Arctic. As it was agreed then, the Alliance is building its policy 
towards the Arctic as a part of “comprehensive approach,” which foresees that 
NATO cooperates together with other institutions like the EU and the Arctic 
Council. Granting the High North with the strategic importance to the Alliance, 
Jaap de Hoop Scheffer admitted that NATO has equal interests in other parts of 
the world, labeling none of them as the most important avoiding in this way the 
path of regionalization and fragmentation, which could undermine the 
international and European security. The General Secretary said that the main 
task of NATO was to identify threats, challenges, and risks as well as prospects 
and possible gains in the Arctic to determine added value the Alliance could 
bring into the region.
21
 Among the proposed contributions there are the 
following: relief operations, search and rescue operations, and disaster relief 
exercises, management capabilities in the energy and infrastructure domain. 
Speaking about normative dimension of the future of the Arctic, Secretary 
General stressed the importance of the Alliance as a prospective forum of 
dialogue, as four of five Arctic littoral states are members of NATO. At the 
same time, the need for closer cooperation with Russia in the region was 
stressed as an instrument for building mutually beneficial atmosphere in the 
                                                                                                                   
Warsaw 8-9 July 2016,” July 9, 2016, accessed September 17, 2018, 
https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_133169.htm?mode=pressrelease.  
19  North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “Warsaw Summit Communiqué.” July 9, 2016.  
20  North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “NATO discusses security prospects in the High 
North,” January 29, 2009, accessed September 17, 2018, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/ 
natohq/news_49745.htm. 
21  North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “Speech by NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop 
Scheffer on security prospects in the High North,” January 29, 2009, accessed September 
17, 2018, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_50077.htm?selectedLocale=en.  
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Arctic for better addressing common challenges. Special reference in the 
context was given to Norway, which was advocating for the increased role of 
the Arctic in the international agenda for decades. During the meeting the 
interests of non-Arctic actors in the region were emphasized.
22
 As Brooke A. 
Smith-Windsor puts it, it was the first time when NATO’s officials held a serious and 
solid debate about the Alliance’s current and future policy in the region.23  
At the weekly press briefing on January 28, 2009, James Appathurai, 
NATO Spokesman, talking about defense issues related to the North, 
announced that the Arctic region has not been an area of confrontation so far.
24
 
The Alliance did not notice any moves, also from the Russian side, towards 
worsening the situation, and accentuated the need to continue the dialogue to 
clarify any problematic issue that could have occurred. However, he 
emphasized the fact that the military build-up of the Arctic Rim countries 
became visible. A special reference was made towards Russian bomber flights. 
When speaking about the Alliance’s interest in the Arctic, James Appathurai 
confirmed that NATO would engage more actively in the region in order to 
strengthen the existing spirit of cooperation.
25
 
Later, in April 2009, at the Q&A session at the NATO Youth Forum, 
Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer added that the Alliance was 
emphasizing more its political compound rather than the military one, trying to 
enhance its preventive activities. Speaking on the Arctic, the Secretary General 
declared that NATO should not have a military presence in the region, contrary 
to the Russian claims.
26
 At the same time, he stressed that NATO had been 
aware both of the climate change and prospective competition for the energy 
resources of the Arctic. Additional attention was given to the future accessibility 
of existing and potential transport routes in the High North and to the 
capabilities and knowledge the Alliance possesses in the sphere of search and 
rescue, supposing more active collaboration with Russia and other partners. 
Jaap de Hoop Scheffer stressed that NATO could bring added value to the High 
North and should be engaged in the debate about the development and future of 
the Arctic.
27
 On May 18, 2009, giving a speech at NATO Headquarter to the 
                                               
22  North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “Speech by NATO Secretary.” January 29, 2009.  
23  Brooke A. Smith-Windsor, Putting the ‘N’ back into NATO: A High North policy 
framework for the Atlantic Alliance? Research Paper n 94, NATO Defense College, 
2013, July, 1-12, accessed September 17, 2018, http://www.ndc.nato.int/. 
24  North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “Weekly press briefing by NATO Spokesman, James 
Appathurai,” January 28, 2009, accessed September 17, 2018, https://www.nato.int/ 
cps/en/natohq/opinions_50117.htm?selectedLocale=en. 
25  North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “Weekly press briefing.” January 28, 2009.  
26  North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “Q&A session with NATO Secretary General Jaap de 
Hoop Scheffer at the NATO Youth Forum,” April 2, 2009, accessed September 17, 2018, 
https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_52741.htm?selectedLocale=en. 
27  North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “Q&A session with NATO.” April 2, 2009. 
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Inter-allied Confederation of Reserve Officers, Secretary General Scheffer 
declared that climate change in the Arctic had caused a debate over the 
development of search and rescue activities. As a result, NATO has decided to 
focus on the maritime security dimension.
28
 
After 2009, one can notice kind of standstill in NATO’s thinking about 
the Arctic. One can suppose that such a shift might be regarded as a sign of 
unwillingness for greater engagement in the region. On the other hand, the 
Alliance’s agenda became preoccupied with other more urgent issues. 
One might observe a return of the Arctic issues in NATO’s agenda only 
in 2013. The most prominent declaration in this context was made by Secretary 
General Rasmussen, who stated that NATO had no intention to strengthen its 
presence in the High North despite acknowledging increased Russia’s military 
build-up programs in the Arctic.
29
 He also added that the region needs 
cooperation, not confrontation. Addressing the statement, Brooke A. Smith-
Windsor stated that it reflected the consensual level of ambitions of the 
member-states.
30
  
Taking into account that the year 2014 brought serious complications to 
NATO-Russia relations and European defense, one might recognize moderate 
changes in the rhetoric of NATO’s High Officials. Thus, in his speech at the 
Marines’ Memorial Club Hotel on July 9, 2014, Secretary General Anders Fogh 
Rasmussen declared that increasing the accessibility of the Arctic would 
enhance the prospect of potential increased tensions there. At the same time, he 
did not speak out about militarization of the region and/or activities there. He 
stressed that the Arctic should remain a region of peace and stability. However, 
he underlined that Russia had started to strengthen its military presence in the 
Arctic which would be followed closely by NATO and its Allies.
31
 Since the 
conflict between Russia and Ukraine has just started at the moment, the tone of 
NATO’s statements was quite reserved, expressing hopes for a rapid 
improvement of the situation. These hopes, yet, appeared to be illusions. As 
conflict between Russia and Ukraine was swelling, the Alliance has suspended 
all practical civilian and military cooperation with Moscow, remaining open to 
                                               
28  North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “Speech by NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop 
Scheffer to the Inter-allied Confederation of Reserve Officers at NATO HQ,” May 18, 
2009, accessed September 17, 2018, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/ opinions_54796. 
htm?selectedLocale=en.  
29  Gerard O’Dwyer, “NATO Rejects Direct Arctic Presence,” Atlantic Council, May 30, 
2013, accessed September 17, 2018, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ natosource/ 
nato-rejects-direct-arctic-presence. 
30  Smith-Windsor, Putting the ‘N’ back. 
31  North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “America, Europe and the Pacific. Speech by NATO 
Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen at the Marines’ Memorial Club Hotel in San 
Francisco,” July 9, 2014, accessed September 17, 2018, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/ 
natohq/opinions_111659.htm?selectedLocale=en.  
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political dialogue, which was not very successful in fact. In a two-year period, 
2014-2015, attention of NATO was largely focused on Eastern Europe and 
Baltic states. In the context of the new political and security environment, the 
Alliance launched its adaptation process, strengthening its collected defense. 
Speaking at the session of questions and answers of the 174
th
 Military 
Committee in Chiefs of Defense on January 21, 2016, General P. Breedlove 
stressed that NATO would continue upgrading its capabilities for better 
addressing all challenges in all regions of interest, including the Arctic.
32
 
Adjusting to the adaptation process of the Alliance, the official rhetoric 
has correspondingly changed. In April 2016, Secretary General Stoltenberg, in 
his speech to the Atlantic Council, confirmed the presence of the Alliance in the 
Arctic underlying that Danish, Icelandic and Norwegian Forces are the main 
NATO forces in the region. He added that the Alliance should follow the 
developments in the region because of Russian military moves there. At the 
same time, Secretary General was advocating for continuation of collaboration 
between the Arctic littoral states in order not to increase the level of tensions.
33
 
Later this year, at the Plenary session of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, 
Secretary General admitted that the Alliance had noticed increased presence of 
Russia in the Arctic. However, Jens Stoltenberg stressed that the Arctic is the 
area of strong and mutually beneficial cooperation between all Arctic coastal 
states both within the Arctic Council and bilaterally. In his speech, he argued 
for decreasing tension level in the area with simultaneous rise in collaboration 
regardless to worsening relationship between Russia and its Western 
counterparts in other spheres, although he did not mention them.
34
     
In his speech at the NATO Parliamentary Assembly session, delivered on 
the 29
th
 of May, 2017, NATO Deputy Secretary General Rose Gottemoeller 
stated that the Alliance count a lot on its Arctic members to help guide debate 
and discussion on the issue.
35
 Rose Gottemoeller said the Alliance still needs to 
improve the level of knowledge about the processes occurring in the region. At 
                                               
32  North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “Questions and answers,” January 21, 2016, accessed 
September 17, 2018, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_127395.htm? selectedLocale=en. 
33  North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “’Projecting Stability: Charting NATO’s Future’. 
Speech by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg to the Atlantic Council, 
Washington, D.C.,” April 6, 2016, accessed September 17, 2018, https://www.nato.int/ 
cps/en/natohg/opinions 129758.htm?selectedLocale=en.  
34  North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “Address by NATO Secretary General Jens 
Stoltenberg at the Plenary session of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly Fall session in 
Turkey,” November 21, 2016, accessed September 17, 2018, https://www.nato.int/ 
cps/en/natohq/opinions_137787.htm?selectedLocale=en. 
35  North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “Speech by NATO Deputy Secretary General Rose 
Gottemoeller at the NATO Parliamentary Assembly session,” May 29, 2017, accessed 
September 17, 2018, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_144090.htm?selectedL 
ocale=en. 
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the same time, NATO analyses information that comes from other sources, for 
instance from the Committee in NATO’s Parliamentary Assembly. She also 
added that the Alliance was looking for the options to increase its activity in the 
area in certain respects. At the same time, Gottemoeller announced that real 
military challenges were present in the Arctic (for instance, the issue of 
submarines’ incident provocation) and NATO had not paid enough attention to 
the problem for a long period of time. She said that the Alliance would make a 
revision of a military dimension of its presence in the Arctic. In her speech, two 
understandings of the Arctic prevail: environmental and strategic (military).   
Having analyzed both the scope of basic NATO’s documents and 
statements of the Alliance’s High Officials, one might conclude that the 
Alliance consciously and successively tries to avoid producing of the 
comprehensive document on the region, acknowledging, from one side, interests 
and positions of its Arctic Allies, and from the other – attempting to avoid its 
engagement since it might endanger the situation in the region, launching 
securitization process once again there. In other words, one can assume that 
NATO strives to practice rather positive security, regardless the splash of 
activity in 2009.    
 
 
NATO’s Presence in the High North 
 
Obviously, practical activity of the Alliance is strongly interwoven with 
conceptual documents and developments in the international arena. Similar to 
the theoretical dimension there, one can define certain periods which display 
NATO’s approach to the region and its specifics. Practical dimension of 
NATO’s presence reflects the importance of the threats and challenges the 
Alliance has identified in the region. Although the whole spectrum cannot be 
fully classified by the time, three dimensions are usually named: military, 
economy, and environment. When analyzing the practical dimension of 
NATO’s presence in the Arctic, one should state that the Alliance takes some 
actions rather in social, societal, humanitarian, and ecological dimensions. As the 
comprehensive description of such actions is not the major goal of the article, 
the authors concentrate on the analysis of the trends in NATO’s policy in the 
High North allowing to foresee the prospective ways of its development later. 
Having analyzed NATO’s activity in the region in the last decade, one 
can state that the Alliance pays considerable attention mainly to non-military 
threats trying to diminish the level of hostility and tensions contrary to the times 
of the Cold War. This is the major difference in the development of the region 
in post-bipolar times, regardless of the worsening of Russia-NATO relations 
because of the situation in Syria and Ukraine.    
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As the leading role in the region in the early 1990s belonged to the 
northern countries, they have influenced greatly the Arctic agenda in those 
times, which is reflected in NATO’s activity in that period. Therefore, the main 
focus of the Alliance was drawn upon conjunction of the issues from spheres of 
defence, environmental protection, and foreign affairs. Correspondingly, the late 
1990s are marked with activities aimed at reducing the risk for the environment 
both of the region as a whole and for littoral states in particular. Additionally, 
NATO has actively invested in such activities as emergency preparedness and 
response with all Arctic countries, but also with Russia as a sign of enhanced 
cooperation and future closer collaboration in the Arctic. As an example, one 
can name Exercise Arctic-Sarex 96 that was announced as the first one in which 
military units from Russia, the USA and Canada had practiced cooperation in 
search and rescue activities.
36
  
Still, nearly the decade until 2009, the Alliance kept a low profile in the 
Arctic. Its presence in the High North was evident mainly through the 
Integrated Air Defense System (NATINADS). In the context, one can speak 
about fighters on alert and airborne warning, and control surveillance flights. 
Following the famous Russian expedition in 2007 and anxieties of its member-
states, NATO started thinking about transformation of its presence in the region. 
Among some introduced amendments, one can name Icelandic Air Policing 
operation when in 2008 NATO started patrolling Iceland’s air space, although, 
the request by Iceland was sent earlier, in 2006.
37
 Later, after Lisbon Summit in 
2010, NATO has decided to develop NATINADS by adding BMD capability 
creating Integrated Air and Missile Defense System (NATINAMDS).
38
  
On the other side, the practical presence of the Alliance is a subject to 
change, and NATO slowly but gradually expands its presence there, especially 
in the last couple of years. Bearing in mind that NATO is not the most 
influential player in the High North, one should note that a range of activities 
there is done by the Arctic countries, which are the Alliance’s members, on 
bilateral or multilateral basis but without NATO auspices. Such activities 
correspond to their national interests and their understanding of the way the 
Arctic should be managed and developed. At the same time, in the last years, 
the Arctic Allies tried to intensify their cooperation with the Alliance. Thus, an 
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amount of the activities, mainly different types of trainings, are being conducted 
by the Arctic states in cooperation with NATO structures and Partnership for 
Peace (PfP) countries,
39
 and there is a high probability that this trend will be 
strengthened. In this context, the most famous military exercise Cold Response, 
initiated by Oslo in 2006,
40
 could serve as the best example. Meanwhile, it 
should be mentioned that Norway is the most active Alliance member in the 
region. As Luke Coffey put it, “Norway is a leader in promoting NATO’s role 
in the Arctic.”41 Furthermore, in 2010, Norway became the first country to 
move its military headquarters above the Article Circle.
42
 In addition, Joint 
Warfare Centre, which provides NATO’s training focal point for full-spectrum 
joint operational-level warfare, was established in 2003 at Jåttå, Stavanger, 
Norway.
43
 Oslo’s policy aimed at the increase of NATO’s engagement strives to 
unite military and non-military interests in the Arctic addressing a range of 
existing and prospective threats, challenges, and risks simultaneously keeping 
good relations with Moscow. It is only the Norway in the region whose 
approach is maximally close to the positive understanding of the security. 
As it was mentioned earlier, since 2009 the Alliance has started 
upgrading its presence in the Arctic. In the winter of 2009, NATO conducted a 
large-scale Explosives Ordnance Disposal Exercise outside the coast of 
                                               
39  North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “Exercises,” October 25, 2017, accessed September 
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Training,” n.d., accessed September 17, 2018, https://shape.nato.int/exercises.  
40  Norwegian Armed Forces, “Cold Response 2016,” n.d., accessed September 17, 2018, 
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Northern Norway.
44
 Later this year, in June 2009, the Alliance conducted joint 
training exercise Loyal Arrow in Swedish Lapland for both NATO and non-
NATO states.
45
 This training became an outcome of the increased partnership 
between the Alliance, Sweden, and Finland. In this way, after years of relative 
absence in the region, NATO has decided to intensify its activities and the 
cooperation with Stockholm and Helsinki through the 2015 Arctic Challenge 
exercise. Among other regular trainings one should pay attention to the 
Dynamic Mongoose 2017 anti-submarine warfare exercise conducted off the 
coast of Iceland.
46
 As it was stated in the announcement of the Ministry for 
Foreign Affairs of Iceland, such exercises had been previously conducted in 
Norwegian waters. Since the role of Iceland is rapidly increasing in complex 
security environment in the North-Atlantic, the location has been changed. 
Additionally, at the Icelandic Coast Guard facility in Keflavik in 2017, NATO 
conducted Multi-National Bomb Disposal Exercise Northern Challenge.
47
 
Besides, in November 2017, NATO held the exercise Trident Javelin 2017 on 
the basis of the Article Five scenario to train and certify NATO’s command and 
control abilities in a major conflict. The exercise was linked to the Norwegian 
National Exercise.
48
 
Taking into account the gradual growth of NATO’s presence in the 
Arctic, one should mention the scheduled by Sweden large-scale trainings 
Viking 18, which have been initially created in the spirit of NATO’s PfP scheme 
to exercise competencies in the area of peace operations and international crisis 
management.
49
 Meanwhile NATO organizes massive trainings Trident Juncture 
18, which are to be the largest ones scheduled over several years. These 
exercises should ensure that the Alliance’s “forces are able to operate together 
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and ready to respond to a threat from any direction.”50 Additionally, a new 
facility to support NATO’s capabilities for strengthening and enhancing the 
operational capability of the Alliance was established in February 2018 in 
Haderslev, Denmark. As it was stated, such an action should be regarded as 
adequate response to a changed security environment and the continuation of 
the Alliance’s adaptation to current and prospective threats.51  
Though the Alliance’s presence in the High North becomes more visible, 
its Allies hold quite reserved position towards its deeper engagement. The only 
point the Arctic countries have agreed upon refers to Article V, recognizing 
NATO’s importance for their security and defense at large.52 One can admit that 
a kind of unspoken consensus about limited NATO’s presence in the High 
North is established. In consequence, the Arctic has not been directly mentioned 
in any of NATO fundamental documents and it lacks solid presence there. As 
Brooke A. Smith-Windsor wrote in 2013, NATO has been largely excluded 
from the security initiatives in the region.
53
 Till 2018, the situation has not 
substantially changed. However, the mantra “four of five Arctic states are 
NATO members” is often reproduced by NATO’s officials and high 
representatives of the Arctic countries, especially littoral ones.  
On the other hand, none of the Arctic countries, as well as the Alliance as 
a whole, is willing to transform the region into a new theater of prospective war. 
In the context, one can listen to another mantra “High North – low tensions,” 
which is repeated by the Arctic states and the Alliance altogether. Last time at 
the high-level meeting this approach has been reaffirmed at the 2018 Munich 
Security Conference.
54
 On the basis of the actual presence of NATO in the 
region, one can predict that the most possible prospective actions within the 
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framework of increased engagement could be: a reaction to civil emergencies 
situations, large-scale search and rescue operations, ecological crises, and 
maritime security. Political and military dimensions are left for consideration of 
the littoral and non-littoral Arctic states.  
Undoubtedly, the Alliance and the Arctic states try to create a territory of 
dialogue in the High North. However, the dialogue is not possible without the 
clarification of basic definitions, namely the definition of the notion of 
“security.” Here, one can see how big the difference between the theoretical 
debates about security, and its positive and negative understanding, and the 
reality of its practicing is. However, NATO should practice security in the 
region based on its own understanding of the future of the region as a part of the 
comprehensive vision of the modern international arena. Having analyzed the 
practical presence of the Alliance in the High North, one can state that its policy 
is sometimes chaotical being kind of a supplement to the national policies of the 
Arctic members and sometimes a kind of reaction towards Russian engagement 
in the region. In 2015, Sally DeBoer wrote that Washington and Arctic Allies 
should encourage the Alliance to make the Arctic a higher priority.
55
 In the 
authors’ opinion, such a point of view still makes sense. 
 
 
NATO and Russia in the High North 
 
Basically, NATO-Russia relations as a whole influence their interactions 
in the Arctic. Being the biggest Arctic state, Russia cannot be excluded from 
cooperation in the region, including security one. Furthermore, the Arctic 
dimension of NATO-Russia relations for more than twenty years serve as an 
example of mutually beneficial cooperation that has a solid potential in the 
essence, though sometimes problematic. Referring to the positive and negative 
understanding of security and its practicing, one might say that a positive 
approach is highly desirable both for the Alliance and Moscow, especially 
taking into account their interdependencies in extremely harsh environment. 
Simultaneously, the Alliance itself is the major advocate in NATO-Russia 
relations for positive practicing of the security in the High North. Apart of 
interactions within the NATO-Russia framework, Moscow cooperates on the 
range of the issues with member-states of the Alliance on the bilateral ground.  
In particular, such an approach has aroused from the meeting of the 
NATO Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society held in April 1995 
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with its Cooperation Partners.
56
 One can state that it was a beginning of the 
practical desecuritization of the region. Furthermore, such an approach was 
intertwined with the sustainable development of the Arctic since the Alliance 
had to address defense-related environmental issues such as radioactive 
pollution (utilization of spent fuel and other radioactive waste), 
decommissioning of nuclear submarines, and chemical munitions dumped at the 
Barents, the Kara, and the Baltic Sea. The above-mentioned threats and 
challenges demanded collaboration with Moscow, which appeared to be the 
practical implementation of the need to engage Russia in the Western 
community that was constantly articulated in the international arena. Thus, 
NATO has started an active cooperation with Moscow on addressing these 
issues.
57
 When speaking of the bilateral cooperation in the area, the Russian-
Norwegian cooperation should be recognized as the most expanded one in the 
High North. One of the best examples is the Arctic Military Environmental 
Cooperation program established in 1996. On the basis of the Declaration on 
Arctic military environmental cooperation (AMEC Declaration) Norway, 
Russia and the US have been cooperating on the range of military and 
environmental issues threatening the Arctic ecosystem.
58
 The program is 
recognized as one of the most successful in addressing new security challenges. 
However, the beginning of the XXI century has brought substantial 
changes into Russia-NATO relations in the region. Parallel to the changes in 
Russian elites’ thinking about the security in the modern world, approach to the 
cooperation has undergone transformation. Despite positive achievements in 
cooperation with NATO as the organization and its Arctic member-states, one 
should pay attention to those fundamental issues which hamper NATO-Russia 
relations and complicate elaboration and implementation of NATO’s policy in 
the Arctic. Obviously, such issues relate directly to the military domain, which 
significance is strongly connected with the understanding of security. Prior to 
the serious transformation of Russia’s politics in the international and 
particularly European arena, major tensions have constantly concerned areas of 
missile defense and strategic deterrence. The issue is quite painful and sore in 
the political discourse of the Russian Federation being treated as a direct threat 
to its national interests. One should also keep in mind that discussions on the 
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issue always correlate with periods of tensions in NATO-Russia relations and in 
US-Russia relations. Additionally, since the issue has a quite manipulative 
character, it has been often combined with discussions on prospective 
implementation of Article V by NATO. Therefore, one can admit that the main 
problem refers not to the area of collective defense, but rather to essence of 
NATO in post-bipolar world and its policy in the Arctic as well as the way it is 
viewed in Russia. In this context, special attention of Moscow is drawn upon 
joint Danish/American base in Thule and American base in Norway. 
Simultaneously, Russia constantly strengthens its missile defense capabilities, 
in particular in Olenogorsk and in the Komi Republic. 
However, growing tensions between the West and Moscow since 2013 
has largely complicated situation in the High North. Moscow’s aggressive 
behavior has forced NATO officials to change their rhetoric. Thus, in 2014 in 
his speech at the Munich Security Conference, Secretary General Anders Fogh 
Rasmussen, still praising the amount and level of cooperation between Brussels 
and Moscow, noted that both parties have not found a common ground in 
several key areas. The major claim Secretary General made, referred not to the 
different understanding of security, stability, and peace in the Euro-Atlantic area 
but to the need to adhere to principles and guidelines of bilateral and 
multilateral documents signed by Moscow and the Western community. In other 
words, General Secretary supposed that Russia downplays the reached 
agreements leading to the worsening of atmosphere between partners. One of 
the basic principles Moscow decided to breach concerns deployment of 
offensive weapons systems by the Russian Federation, including military build-
up in the Arctic.
59
 Additionally, some observers, politicians, and academics 
have reacted quite emotionally trying to re-securitize Arctic issues and 
discussions about the future of the region yielded to a possible NATO-Russia 
confrontation in the region and speculations about its re-militarization. 
However, these speculations have been toned down rapidly. At the same time, 
Moscow was sanctioned because of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, and the 
Alliance suspended all practical civilian and military cooperation with Russia,
60
 
which later was reaffirmed in the Wales Summit Declaration.
61
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Those developments in the international arena have accentuated other 
substantial issues referring to the Arctic and security practicing there by NATO 
and Moscow. While the Alliance took a momentum to redefine its policy as a 
whole trying to elaborate new mechanisms for securing its values and 
principles, as well as the security of its member-states, Moscow has turned back 
to its traditional security approach. In this context, one can observe that since 
2014 Russia increased its military presence in the Arctic quite often conducting 
provocative activities.
62
 However, the Alliance follows reserved politics 
towards such activity simultaneously articulating its concerns and calling Russia 
for changing its behavior. The main anxiety addressed by the Arctic states refers 
to the largest Russia’s fleet, the Northern, stationed in the Arctic and equipped 
with the icebreaker vessels of all types, including nuclear-powered ones. 
Previously, Russia used its potential in peaceful aims, in particular in 
cooperation with Norwegian fleet and its armed forces at the Kola Peninsula 
when conducting a range of trainings, for instance the annual military Exercise 
POMOR and the annual Barents Exercise in the search and rescue domain.
63
 
Nevertheless, there are no current concerns that Moscow can use its undeniable 
advantage in prospective military maritime operations in the Arctic. The second 
fear shared by the Russia’s Western partners deals with the renewal of its long-
range bomber patrols, in particular in the Arctic. Though such patrolling was 
resumed in 2007, it reached its high point in 2014,
64
 which can be undoubtedly 
explained by the developments in Eastern Ukraine and the Western reaction 
towards the conflict. Such a conduct of the Russian Federation has become “the 
new normal” since then. Obviously, such behavior by Russia should be 
regarded as a display of negative security practicing having its foundations in 
the Military Doctrine 2014. 
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One more point causing tensions between two parties refers to the so-
called GIUK
65
 problem. This is a geographical chokepoint providing the access 
to the Arctic Ocean from the North Atlantic. The Alliance lacks military 
presence there, which increases concerns that Russia could use this area on its 
prospective way to the North Atlantic in case of a conflict.
66
  
Summing up, one can clearly see Russia’s shift from positive security 
practicing towards the negative one in the Arctic, while the Alliance tries to 
preserve its positive security practicing simultaneously reacting to the 
developments in European and the international arena. NATO’s approach 
towards the relationships with Moscow should be recognized as more balanced 
and strategic, taking into account the importance of the region and the mutual 
cooperation with Russia. Undoubtedly, the Alliance and the Russian Federation 
will develop their interactions in future, since Moscow cannot and should not be 
omitted in the Arctic, thus the framework of their cooperation becomes the main 
concern. Prospects of NATO’s future policy in the Arctic, including partnership 
with Russia, are to be discovered in the last section of the article. 
 
 
NATO’s Prospective Policy in the High North 
 
Considering the results of the conducted analysis of the Alliance’s 
presence in the Arctic during the post-bipolar period, one might face 
considerable difficulties while trying to envisage NATO’s prospective policy in 
the region even in the short-term perspective. The major problem corresponds to 
the fact that NATO does not clearly identify its interests in the region and 
cannot clearly frame its Arctic policy apart from general statements. At the 
same time, the authors try to present their vision of future NATO’s policy in the 
Arctic for the next five years, complementing it with the recommendations.    
Taking into account the position NATO has adhered to for nearly thirty 
years now, one might suppose that Brussels will try to keep it as long as 
possible not to provoke rapid and irreversible developments in the political and 
military spheres in the region. The major principle of NATO there – keeping the 
region peaceful – would be implemented at any expense since the Alliance 
recognizes potential losses military confrontation could bring. Furthermore, a 
change of NATO’s behavior in the Arctic in the direction of increased military 
presence should be a continuation of its general policy in the international 
                                               
65  This is an acronym for area in the Northern Atlantic ocean between Greenland, Iceland 
and the United Kingdom.   
66  Paul Mcleary, “In Return to Cold War Posture, U.S. Sending Sub-Hunting Planes to 
Iceland,” Foreign Policy, December 4, 2017, accessed September 17, 2018, 
https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/12/04/in-return-to-cold-war-posture-u-s-sending-sub-
hunting-planes-to-iceland/. 
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arena, which currently seems to be completely impossible as the Alliance has 
chosen different from bipolar times way of guaranteeing and practicing security. 
In this context, one should expect that the Alliance will not strengthen its 
military presence in the region. However, the trend of enhancing military 
positions by its Arctic littoral and non-littoral states will be preserved. At the 
same time, NATO would rather be forced by its member-states to clarify its 
position in the issue of providing security guarantees to its Arctic member-
states. One might expect that the Alliance will develop its standalone Arctic 
policy displayed in the official documents with interpretation of the possible 
implementation of Article V in the Arctic. Taking into consideration the 
prospective consequences for the whole humanity, the authors tend to believe 
that NATO would clearly disavow its introduction in the region, inasmuch as 
ecological concerns are of extreme importance for the mankind and are 
recognized by NATO to be considerable in the Arctic. One should expect that 
NATO’s policy will be coordinated with its Arctic members, especially with the 
Norwegian one. This way, one might anticipate that NATO will amplify its 
efforts in tackling ecology challenges and risks in the Arctic. 
In the above-mentioned context, one might expect that the Alliance can 
establish a new body within the organization responsible for the Arctic dimension. 
Such a department is to operate on the fundamental NATO’s documents, monitor the 
situation in the region on the daily basis, analyze and define broadly-understood 
security challenges there. Additionally, the Alliance can initiate regular meetings of 
its Arctic member-states and Associated Allies in the Arctic to discuss urgent issues 
in the region. If needed, such format of cooperation could be enlarged including other 
member-states and non-NATO partners. The Mediterranean Dialogue could be taken 
as a prototype for such a format. 
Additionally, taking into account processes in the international arena, the 
Alliance will pay more attention to the economy and energy issues, considering 
that it has been already indicated in its official documents. Since the 
globalization is still accelerating and world’s economy demands more 
resources, issues relating to new sources of resources, as well as their 
management, will be in the spotlight of the international community including 
NATO, especially taking into account that such issues influence directly 
security of modern states. When it comes to the prospective transport routes due 
to the ice melting in the Arctic, the authors doubt the issue can be managed by 
the Alliance. Such an issue would be a subject for the regulation by the 
provisions of the international law elaborated rather within the United Nations.  
When it comes to the relations with Russia, one should acknowledge the 
importance of the development path to be chosen by Moscow. Currently, one 
must say that Russia keeps its traditional Cold War-oriented understanding of 
the security and means of its protection. Additionally, the outcome of the last 
presidential elections in March 2018 confirms that country moves on the way of 
authoritarianism, limiting partnership, and cooperation with the Western 
community. In this regard, one must state that Moscow would rather prefer to 
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develop its part of the Arctic on its own. Continuation of the military buildup is 
possible; however, the intensity and scale should not be overestimated since 
Russia lacks resources, especially financial. Economic sanctions, imposed on 
Moscow after its annexation of Ukrainian Crimea, inspiration and support of 
separatists on Ukrainian Donbas, continue to play a substantial role in slowing 
down, and in the longer run, halting such a buildup, forcing Russian elites to 
reconsider their confrontational strategies. In its turn, NATO should not 
disregard the process and should upgrade its own technologies and facilities, in 
particular in its Arctic member-states, in order to react adequately in case of 
potential conflict. However, such prospective NATO’s policy should strictly 
correspond with its new understanding of security and aim at preservation of 
peace and stability in the region, as well as mutually beneficial cooperation of 
all interested actors in the Arctic. This is the major difference between Russian 
and NATO’s approach to the development of the region in the modern-day 
reality. Prospects of multilateral cooperation in the region are likely to be 
conducted within the Arctic Council. Thus, cooperation between NATO and 
Moscow will not be restored during the new presidency of Vladimir Putin. In 
case of an emergency situation (for example, a large-scale search and rescue 
operation) in the region, NATO-Russia cooperation can be enacted for the 
defined period of time. 
Overall, prospective and consistent NATO’s policy in the High North should 
contribute to the enlarged space of freedom, stability, and peace, as well as a 
sustainable development and economic growth. In this context, the Alliance’s policy 
should encompass the following strategic objectives: effective deterrence and credible 
collective defence, economic security and ecological security. In the case of the 
elaboration and implementation of such policy, NATO could fill the present security 
governance vacuum in the Arctic. The major point concerning prospective NATO’s 
policy relates to the fact that the North-Atlantic Treaty Organization definitely should 
be present in the region applying its potential, knowledge, and facilities in order to 
strengthen security and create a space of prosperity and cooperation in the Arctic, 
since it can become a uniting point for different international actors, give the common 
ground and new (re)start for the civilization which way of modern development 
seems to come to a dead-end.  
 
 
Conclusions 
 
The article sought to examine the policy the North-Atlantic Treaty 
Organization should shape to meet security requirements of the post-bipolar 
period in the European and international arena addressing simultaneously 
expectations of its member-states. It has shown that regardless of its 
complicated path of development since the end of the Cold War, the Alliance 
firmly adheres to new political thinking about security as a phenomenon and 
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security environment in Euro-Atlantic region. Acknowledging the emergence of 
new threats, risks, and challenges in the last thirty years and their combination 
with the old ones, NATO emphasizes the importance of the dialogue addressing 
them. At the same time, the Alliance reserves the right to react under forced 
conditions. The actions towards the Russian Federation since the beginning of 
the conflict with Ukraine are the last example of such policy. This confirms that 
NATO’s policy in the post-bipolar world is quite coherent and flexible, aimed at 
protection of its member-states. However, it remains comprehensive, complex 
and moderate, avoiding unnecessary confrontation. As the study has shown, the 
Alliance has chosen positive security practicing as the most relevant to the post-
bipolar international order based on principles of liberal democracy, market 
economy and human rights. In this paradigm, NATO guarantees security to its 
member-states simultaneously deepening and expanding collaboration with 
them and its associated partners.  
The need to elaborate the Arctic policy has become a natural continuation 
of NATO’s transformation process, which is inherently linked with reshaping of 
the security space in the Euro-Atlantic zone. However, NATO has faced 
difficulties when trying to elaborate its Arctic policy since it has not been 
smooth evolution of its cooperation with Arctic countries with Norway in the 
first place but forced due to Russian aggressive moves in the North Pole in 
2007. However, even then, NATO’s officials have kept quite low and have had 
a reserved stance towards external pressure from some of its member-states and 
other actors accentuating the need for the enhanced research monitoring the 
situation and maintenance of the dialogue with all interested parties. As the 
paper has investigated, the Alliance has chosen the position of the compromise 
when addressing aspirations and fears of its member-states, and put the issue of 
prospective added value it can bring into the region in the future at the core of 
its emerging Arctic policy. As a result, such a stance has been both criticized 
and praised but it obviously proves that NATO adheres to positive security 
practicing trying to make use of every possibility available in the High North, 
taking into consideration an amount of factors, which require quite cautious and 
mature reaction. Such an attitude of the Alliance confirms that European 
countries fully understand the evolution of the security conception in the post-
bipolar period considering the fact that ensuring security cannot be equated to 
the military domain. As it is shown, the Arctic countries play a considerable 
role in engaging NATO in the Arctic. However, even at the initial stage of its 
elaboration, NATO’s Arctic policy cannot be treated as identical to Norway 
Arctic policy, for instance. The study confirms that the Alliance tries to balance 
negative and positive conceptions of security keeping in mind more complicated 
goals in a wider security context, while part of its member-states advocate for 
more liberal and cooperative approach towards the Arctic issues whereas others 
would like to act the way traditional power politics was conducted previously.  
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An additional and meaningful point in security discussions about 
NATO’s presence in the High North refers to the relations with Russia, which 
simultaneously influence the Alliance transformation and the development of 
the Arctic. As this article has shown, NATO appeals for Moscow engagement 
in the region, as its comprehensive development is impossible without 
cooperation with Russia. However, such collaboration directly depends on 
Russian attitude towards security and its practicing. Since the beginning of the 
Russian-Ukrainian conflict, Moscow prefers the Cold-War rhetoric and actions 
using the Arctic as an element in its manipulative domestic and foreign policy. 
Nevertheless, such policy cannot prevent the Alliance from an elaboration on its 
own. At the same time, the study has confirmed that neither the North-Atlantic 
Treaty Organization nor Moscow plan to remilitarize the region as it was in 
bipolar times, what stipulates that NATO will rather concentrate on engaging 
other non-Arctic actors in the region trying to reach the goals which could have 
been reached with Moscow. 
Summing up, the study assumes that the Alliance would undoubtedly 
become a more proactive player in the region. However, its presence in the 
High North will be maintained in different spheres ensuring security via diverse 
ways. Though, the military component will be preserved, and Article V will still 
possess its deterrent meaning. The article foresees the development of different 
forms of multilateral cooperation, which would include NATO or would be held 
under its auspices. The study envisages that as a cumulative effect, the 
prospective NATO’s Arctic policy will bring an added value to the High North 
simultaneously increasing the level of international and European security. 
